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CRIMINAL LAW-Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges
in Jury Selection: State of New Mexico v. Sandoval
I. INTRODUCTION
In State of New Mexico v. Sandoval,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded Sandoval's lower court convictions, based on the
prosecutor's failure to comply with constitutional requirements regarding
possible racial discrimination during petit jury selection.2 The Sandoval
court held that when the defendant makes a prima facie case of discrim-
ination, based on the prosecutor's possible discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges, the burden shifts to the state to rebut the prima facie
case.' More importantly, the court held that the defendant need not go
beyond the circumstances of his case to show discrimination.4
This note will examine the precedents relied upon by the court, and
the implications of this ruling in New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sandoval was convicted for multiple counts of armed robbery and false
imprisonment, with firearm sentencing enhancement.' Sandoval appealed
on seven grounds.6 One basis for the appeal was an assertion that the
State used peremptory challenges to remove all members of the defend-
ant's race from the jury.7 The New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed
the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, based on Sandoval's
claim of racial discrimination.' The court of appeals found that the trial
court erred in not applying the standard enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky,9 for determining whether racial
discrimination was the basis for the use of peremptory challenges by the
1. 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. Id. at 700, 736 P.2d at 505. A petit jury is "[tlhe ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal
action; so called to distinquish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed.
1979). A grand jury is a "[blody of citizens, the number of whom varies from state to state, whose
duties consist in determining whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed and
whether an indictment (true bill) should be returned against one for such a crime." Id.
3. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 700, 736 P.2d at 505.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 697, 736 P.2d at 502.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 700, 736 P.2d at 505.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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prosecution. 0 The New Mexico trial court had applied an overruled stan-
dard from Swain v. Alabama," and had required the defendant to show
systematic exclusion of a racial group, beyond the defendant's case.' 2
The Batson standard is easier for the defendant to meet, because it does
not require any evidence beyond the circumstances of the defendant's
trial. '"
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Peremptory challenges to jurors are challenges that do not require a
showing of cause." Theoretically, peremptories are used when sufficient
reasons to challenge for cause cannot be shown, but jurors are suspected
of being prejudiced against a party. ' 5 At common law, the defendant was
allowed thirty-five peremptory challenges for the most serious crimes,
but the number fluctuated below that at times. 6 The king was not limited
in the number of peremptories allowed at common law, but later was
restricted to challenges for cause certain.' 7 Eventually, peremptories for
both sides became accepted. 8 These common law roots provided the
beginning for peremptories in the United States. "
The uncontrolled exercise of peremptory challenges has potential to
lead to violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States. The Sixth Amendment provides that the
accused in a criminal proceeding shall enjoy a trial by an impartial jury.20
The jury must be drawn from a fair cross section of the community, to
satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.2 ' Excluding significant
groups of the community violates the Sixth Amendment, because drawing
10. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 700, 736 P.2d at 505.
11. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
12. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 699, 736 P.2d at 504.
13. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. Batson rejected the Swain standard of proof which required the
defendant to show systematic exclusion beyond the defendant's trial. Id. at 93.
14. W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 191 (2d. ed. 1971) [hereinafter W. FORSYTH). A
prosecutor can ordinarily exercise peremptory challenges for any reason, in his view related to the
outcome of the case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
15. J. PROFFATr, TRIAL BY JURY 207 (1877) [hereinafter J. PROFFATrI. "[Cihallenges for cause
permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of par-
tiality .... " Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. The relatively strict standard for challenges for cause makes
peremptories particularly attractive for removing potential jurors for reasons such as lack of attention
or other reasons that would not suffice for challenges for cause.
16. J. PROFFArr, supra note 15, at 208.
17. W. FORSYTHr, supra note 14, at 192. Unlimited challenges led to delays, so the king's number
of challenges was limited. id.
18. Id.
19. Swain, 380 U.S. at 214.
20. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
21. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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a jury from a fair cross section of the community is impossible when
significant groups are excluded.22 This does not impose a requirement
that the jury must mirror the distinctive groups of the community, how-
ever. 23
The requirement of the Sixth Amendment of trial by an impartial jury
is binding on state courts, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process and equal protection to
citizens, and the Equal Protection Clause is violated, if a prosecutor
peremptorily challenges potential jurors solely on the basis of their race.25
The Fourteenth Amendment applies to the selection of the jury venire as
well as the selection of the petit jury, in order to protect the accused
throughout the proceedings.26
A. Modern Cases Concerning Peremptories and Discrimination
Swain v. Alabama was the controlling case in the United States, con-
cerning peremptory challenges and racial discrimination, for many years.27
The Swain Court dealt not only with the question of peremptory strikes,
but also with the question of discrimination in the selection of members
of grand jury and petit jury venires.28 The Swain Court faced the fact that
no Black had served on a petit jury in Talladega County, Alabama, for
nearly fourteen years.29 Black males over the age of twenty-one consti-
tuted twenty-six percent of all males in Talladega County in that age
group.3" Eight Blacks were members of Swain's petit jury venire, but
two were exempt, and the other six were stricken through the use of
peremptory challenges by the prosecutor.3' The United States Supreme
Court found that any discrimination was not intentional and that an im-
22. Id.
23. Id. at 538. This is an important point to understand. Defendants are not entitled to a jury
that consists of all groups of the community or any members of the defendant's race. Id. Defendants
are entitled to a jury chosen from a panel of potential jurors that has not been chosen by excluding
distinctive groups of the community. Id.
24. Id. at 526. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The exercise of peremptory challenges by
the State is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 88.
27. Swain was considered the guiding case in this area of law, from the time of the decision in
1964, until a major portion of the decision was rejected in Batson, in 1986.
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205. Evidence presented showed that Blacks constituted only 10% to
15% of the grand and petit jury venires chosen since 1953. Id.
29. Id. However, Blacks had served on nearly 80% of grand juries during this time. Id. Two
Blacks served on the grand jury that indicted Swain. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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perfect system of selection is not the same as purposeful discrimination.32
The Swain Court found that the defendant did not meet a requirement
of showing systematic exclusion of Blacks in cases beyond the defend-
ant's.33 Such a requirement demands that the defendant must somehow
compile data relating to the prosecutor's use of peremptories in other
cases, in advance of the defendant's awareness that the issue might be-
come relevant.34
The Swain Court discussed the history of peremptory challenges,35 and
viewed peremptories as a necessary part of jury trials.36 The United States
Constitution does not provide for the right of peremptory challenges, but
they are considered an important right by the courts.37
The Swain Court assumed that peremptory challenges were used to
choose an impartial and qualified jury.38 With this assumption in mind,
the Court stated that the striking of Blacks in a case, even all Blacks, is
not a denial of equal protection.39 The Court's deference to the existence
of peremptory challenges forced the Court to allow the prosecutor to
strike without explanation of motives or reasons." Justice Goldberg ar-
gued in a dissenting opinion that when a choice must be made between
peremptory challenges and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment must be chosen.4' However, Justice Goldberg would require
the defendant to prove systematic exclusion beyond the defendant's own
case.42 Defendant's have a right to trial by a jury selected in a nondis-
criminatory manner.43 Peremptories can be exercised in a manner con-
32. Id. at 209. The "imperfect" system in Talladega County did not function as Alabama law
required. Id. at 206-207. Three jury commissioners were supposed to place the names of all males
over 21, who met certain morality standards, on the jury role. Id. at 206. In practice, however, the
jury commissioners simply selected people of whom they were aware through various sources such
as church lists and conversations. Id. at 207.
33. Id. at 225.
34. State of New Mexico v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 487, 612 P.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App. 1980).
35. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id. Peremptories are considered an important right, because they "eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides" and assure that the jurors will decide the case on the issues presented to
them. Id. In England, peremptory challenges have been used rarely for a century, but the right is
still available. Id. at 213 n. 12.
38. Id. at 221.
39. Id. at 222. The Court stated that a Black is not entitled to a jury containing Blacks, but
purposeful or deliberate exclusion of Blacks based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 203-204.
40. As long as peremptories were considered a challenge that did not require justification, rec-
ognizing their existence meant that no justification could be required.
41. Id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg did not believe that such a choice was
necessary in Swain, however. Id. He believed that Swain had shown a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under settled decisions, and if the Court followed those precedents, no constitutional
decision would be necessary. Id. at 245.
42. Id.
43. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86.
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sistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, but they can also be used improperly
to defeat the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Swain burden
of proof" and found that a defendant can show purposeful racial dis-
crimination in jury selection solely on the facts of the defendant's case.45
The Batson Court stated that the ultimate issue is discrimination in the
defendant's case.' The defendant must first establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by: (1) showing that the defendant is a member of a
cognizable racial group, and the prosecution has removed members of
the defendant's race by peremptory challenges; and (2) showing that the
prosecutor used that practice in a racially motivated manner.47 The de-
fendant can rely on the fact that peremptory challenges make it possible
for discrimination to occur.48
Justice Marshall argued in a concurring opinion that the only way to
eliminate racial discrimination from peremptory challenges is to eliminate
peremptory challenges.49 He believed that a prima facie case is difficult
for a defendant to show, especially if only one or two Black jurors survive
the challenges for cause.50
The new standard of proof under Batson is not ideal. While Batson
enables a defendant to show discriminatory exclusion in an easier and
more realistic manner, a prosecutor who chooses to discriminate can still
manipulate the rules.5 If a defendant can make a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present racially
neutral reasons for excluding the members of the defendant's race.52 The
prosecutor's reasons do not have to rise to the level of exclusions for
cause,53 but the prosecutor cannot merely state that the reasons were not
44. Id. at 93.
45. id. at 95.
46. Id. Batson based his claim on alleged violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, but the Court resolved his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and expressed no view
on his Sixth Amendment claim. Id. at 84-85 n.4. However, the Court in Taylor found that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to a jury from a representative cross section of the community
were violated by a state statute that excluded women from jury duty unless they specifically requested
to serve. 419 U.S. at 525.
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 102-103. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall believed that state officers had
turned to more subtle ways of excluding Blacks from jury venires, because the Court invalidated
laws allowing discrimination in jury selection. "[I]n 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western District
of Missouri involving [B]lack defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 81% of [Bilack
jurors." Id. 103 (citing United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425
U.S. 961 (1976)).
50. ld. at 105.
51. Id. at 106. The prosecution is only required to present racially neutral reasons for the challenge
in question. This is not a difficult standard for a creative prosecutor who chooses to discriminate.
52. Id. at 97.
53. Id.
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racially motivated.54 Some actual neutral reasons must be presented."
The Supreme Court did not provide, in Batson, an exact standard for
evaluating the prosecutor's neutral reasons, however.56 This gives a great
deal of discretion to the trial judge in determining the adequacy of the
prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.
The Batson Court's "creation" of a new standard to show discrimi-
nation in jury selection was more accurately a resurrection and expansion
of an old and apparently forgotten standard. The Batson Court cites the
case of Avery v. Georgia" at various places in the Court's opinion." The
Batson Court, however, does not present Avery in full light. Although
the factual situation was different in Avery than in Batson, a similar test
evolved. The predominant factual distinction between the two cases is
that the discrimination in Avery was found in the supposed random se-
lection of potential jurors by a judge, not by the use of peremptory
challenges by the prosecution.59 The Avery Court stated that, in order to
show discrimination in jury selection, the defendant must make a prima
facie case of discrimination; then the defendant's case alone is enough
to shift the burden to the state to overcome.' This method is very similar
to the test announced in Batson.6 The Court decided Avery decades before
Batson, but did not apply Avery to cases in the interim.62 Avery appeared
to be clear precedent for forming a relaxed standard of proof for the
defendant, but Swain moved in the opposite direction and increased the
burden.
B. Effects of Improper Use
The use of peremptory challenges for reasons other than choosing a
fair and impartial jury raises the issue of their usefulness and appropri-
ateness in our judicial system. The purported benefit of peremptory chal-
54. Id. at 97-98.
55. Id. at,98.
56. The Court provided only that neutral reasons be given. Id. Shifty eyes, uncombed hair, and
large feet are all neutral reasons. Only the realms of the human imagination can place a limit on
such a standard.
57. 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 n.3, 88, 96.
59. Avery, 345 U.S. at 561.
60. Id. at 562-63.
61. The Avery test is a skeletal form of the Batson test. Batson sets forth steps that the defendant
must use to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96. Avery only states that a
prima facie case must be made. 345 U.S. at 563. Batson provides that after the defendant makes a
prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecutor must give neutral reasons for the questioned
challenges. 476 U.S. at 97. Avery only provides that after the defendant makes a prima facie case
of discrimination, the burden shifts to the State to overcome. 345 U.S. at 563. Avery does not
provide the type of reasons necessary for the State to use to overcome the burden.
62. Avery was decided in 1963, 33 years before Batson.
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lenges is a more fair and impartial jury than could be achieved without
the use of such challenges.63 This view of jury selection ignores the fact
that peremptories have been used to discriminate,' which defeats their
purpose of fairness and impartiality.
Uncontrolled use of peremptories affects the challenged juror, also.
The potential juror, who is excused by peremptory challenge, loses his
right, at that particular time, to participate in the legal system. This is
an important right reserved for law-abiding citizens. To many people,
jury duty may be the only time that the legal system has an opportunity
to directly touch and influence their lives with an experience that will
not soon fade. It is unfair, indeed, to snatch from such people this reward
and opportunity, based on some inference, for example, that they may
be too old to sympathize with the defendant or too poor to sympathize
with the State.
IV. DISCUSSION: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN
NEW MEXICO
A. Statutes
New Mexico statutes provide for a varying number of peremptory
challenges, based on the level of court hearing the case and the severity
of the possible punishment for the offense charged.65 For example, in
New Mexico, an offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment,
which would be heard at the district court level, would permit twelve
peremptory challenges for the defense and eight for the state.' 6 In all
other cases, the defense would be permitted five peremptory challenges,
and the state would be permitted three peremptories.67
B. Modern Cases
The Batson decision was the basis for the New Mexico Court of Appeals
to reverse and remand Sandoval.68 In Sandoval, the trial judge was un-
aware of the new standards and procedures that Batson presented, and
63. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212.
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99. "In 100 felony trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors
peremptorily struck 405 out of 467 eligible [Bilack jurors." Id. at 104 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"[l1n 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 in Spartansburg County, South Carolina, involving [Bilack
defendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of [Bilack jurors." Id. at 103.
65. N.M.R. CRIM. P. §§ 7-605(C), 6-605(C), 5-606(D) (1978). Actually, the severity of the offense
charged would also determine what level of court would hear the case. An exception to this is that
petty misdemeanors and misdemeanors can be heard in a magistrate court as well as a metropolitan
court. The same number of peremptories are allowed in both of those courts, for the same category
of offense charged. N.M.R. CRIM. P. §§7-605(C), 6-605(C) (1978).
66. N.M.R. CRIM. P. §5-606(D)(l)(a) (1978).
67. Id. at (D)(l)(b).
68. Sandoval, 105 N.M. at 699, 736 P.2d at 504.
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applied the law as it stood before Batson.69
The law concerning peremptory challenges in New Mexico, prior to
Sandoval, was set forth in State of New Mexico v. Crespin.7° In Crespin,
the state exercised a peremptory challenge against the only Black member
of the jury venire. 7' Crespin claimed error to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals, because the trial court refused to require the state to explain its
reasons for the challenge.7" This was an issue of first impression in New
Mexico.73
The Crespin court recognized the requirement, from Swain, of showing
systematic exclusion and provided two techniques for showing such sys-
tematic exclusion.74 The defendant could show a pattern of discrimination,
on the part of the prosecutor, in cases beyond the defendant's,75 or the
defendant could show systematic exclusion by the absolute number of
challenges in the defendant's case.76
The Crespin court recognized a presumption that the prosecution
properly uses its peremptory challenges.77 However, a helpful procedure
for rebutting that presumption was noted in People v. Wheeler.78 If a party
believes that peremptory challenges are being used because of group bias,
the party must fulfill three requirements to rebut the presumption in favor
of proper use.79 The three requirements are: first, the party must timely
raise the point and make a prima facie case; second, the party must show
that the persons challenged are members of a cognizable group; and third,
the party must show that there is a strong likelihood that the challenges
were made because of the group association.80 In Wheeler, the prosecutor
peremptorily challenged at least seven Blacks.8 ' However, in Crespin,
only one Black was challenged, so the court distinguished Wheeler on
the facts.82
The requirement of broader-based discrimination is the standard used
by the United States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama.83 The Crespin
69. Id.
70. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717.
78. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, reh'g denied, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
79. Id. at 280, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905, 583 P.2d at 764.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
82. Crespin, 94 N.M. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717.
83. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
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court stated that it was controlled by Swain.84 The Crespin court also
recognized that the burden of proof on the defendant in Swain was too
great, and so provided the alternate method from People v. Wheeler."
In State of New Mexico v. Davis, 6 a case very similar to Crespin, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals reiterated the standards set forth in Crespin.87
The Davis court held that the exclusion by peremptory challenge of the
sole Black venireman on the jury panel did not meet either standard
pronounced in Crespin.88 Batson alleviates the harsh burden of proof
required in Davis, since the exclusion of even one juror for racially
motivated reasons is grounds for reversal.89
In deciding Sandoval, the New Mexico Court of Appeals had the benefit
of much guidance. The United States Supreme Court had decided Batson,
and the- Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had decided United States v.
Chalan, ° which interpreted Batson.
C. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Chalan, an American Indian, was convicted of first degree murder,
robbery, and the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent
crime. 9 During jury selection at his trial, all members of his race were
removed from the jury venire." One, and possibly two, were excused
for cause, and the remaining two were removed by peremptory challenge
by the government.93 The defendant raised the issue of all members of
his race being struck from the jury.94 The prosecutor did not present a
valid reason for striking one of the jurors, but the district court reasoned
that the striking of one juror without a valid reason did not present a
prima facie case of discrimination.95
The United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Chalan had
established a prima facie case for intentional discrimination, under the
test set forth in Batson.96 Chalan was a member of a cognizable racial
group; members of his group were stricken by the government; and the
government used peremptory challenges to strike the remaining member
84. Crespin, 94 N.M. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717.
85. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718.
86. 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612, cert. denied, 99 N.M. 522, 660 P.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1983).
87. Id. at 524-25, 660 P.2d at 614-15.
88. Id.
89. Crespin, 94 N.M. at 487, 612 P.2d at 717.
90. 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
91. Id. at 1304.
92. Id. at 1312.
93. Id. The Chalan court noted that the striking of only one juror was questioned, since the other
juror struck by peremptory challenge could have been excused for cause.
94. 812 F.2d at 1312.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1314.
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of his group from the jury.97 The striking of one juror was sufficient to
invoke the Batson test.98 The Chalan court noted the particular suscep-
tibility of peremptory challenges to be used for racial discrimination,
since peremptory challenges traditionally have not required an explanation
of reasons for the challenge."
Chalan was convicted prior to Batson, but his conviction was vacated
for a hearing on the reasons for the government's exclusion of the jury
member. "00 The case of Griffith v. Kentucky' °' provides that Batson applies
retroactively to all cases pending on direct review. '02 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly applied Batson to Chalan.
D. Effects of Sandoval
The decision in Sandoval is a decision based on binding precedent that
could not be ignored. The Sandoval decision is a drastic step, in New
Mexico, toward easing the burden on the defendant to prove racial dis-
crimination during jury selection. Sandoval also provides an opportunity
to eliminate all types of discrimination in jury selection. 103 The Swain
Court stated that constitutional protection applies to any identifiable group
that may be subject to prejudice."4 Discrimination occurs against groups
in our society based on age, social status, and many other reasons not
racially motivated. Courts have spoken in terms of racial and sexual
discrimination, but those seem no worse than any other type of discrim-
97. Id. The court seemed to weigh the cumulative effect of challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges, to decide that the Batson test had been met. Id. The prosecutor had removed all members
of the defendant's race, by using a combination of peremptories and challenges for cause. Id. at
1313-14.
98. Id. at 1314.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1317.
101. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
102. Id. at 327.
103. In State of New Mexico v. Hall, the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted a restricted
view of when a defendant can use the Batson test to show purposeful discrimination. 107 N.M. 17,
751 P.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 17, 751 P.2d 701 (1988). In Hall, the
defendant, who is Black, contended that the prosecutor's use of peremptories to remove most
Hispanic-surnamed members from the the jury venire denied the defendant certain rights. Id. at 705.
The court held that the Batson test applies to members of the defendant's race. Id. The court held
that Hall did not show substantial underrepresentation of his race, so he failed to meet his burden
of proof. Id. This is a partial blow to any future expansion of Sandoval, but only in the limited
situation of a defendant claiming purposeful exclusion of a race other than the defendant's.
The rationale offered in Hall is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Taylor.
419 U.S. at 526. Taylor, a male, claimed that because females were excluded from jury duty by
Louisiana statutes and the Louisiana Constitution, unless they requested in writing to serve, his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. Id. The Supreme Court found that there was
no rule that requires that only members of an excluded class can raise such claims. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded Taylor's conviction, based on his claim of purposeful exclusion of
women. Id. at 538.
104. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
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ination that affects the impartiality of a jury. Perhaps the courts of New
Mexico will view Sandoval as a means to the constitutionally guaranteed
end of a jury selected without discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendants do not care what kind of discrimination resulted in their
convictions. A conviction requires punishment, and, if obtained by the
use of discriminatory jury selection, is a violation of constitutional rights.
If all types of discrimination in jury selection are eliminated, or at least
held to the Batson standard, peremptory challenges will be of limited
use. Perhaps that is the natural progression that should occur. Peremptory
challenges should only be used to excuse a potential juror who is incapable
of forming an unbiased decision, not to shape a jury to insure a favorable
decision. Sandoval can be the first step in a movement to achieve the
proper use of peremptory challenges in New Mexico.
ROBERT L. PIDCOCK
